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A sudden stop of capital flows into a developing country tends to be followed by a rapid 
switch from trade deficits to surpluses, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and 
decreases in output and total factor productivity.  Substantial reallocation takes place 
from the nontraded sector to the traded sector.  We construct a multisector growth model, 
calibrate it to the Mexican economy, and use it to analyze Mexico’s 1994–95 crisis.  
When subjected to a sudden stop, the model accounts for the trade balance reversal and 
the real exchange rate depreciation, but it cannot account for the decreases in GDP and 
TFP.  Extending the model to include labor frictions and variable capital utilization, we 
still find that it cannot quantitatively account for the dynamics of output and productivity 
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1.  Introduction 
A sudden stop of capital flows into a developing country tends to be followed by a switch 
from trade deficits to surpluses, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and decreases in 
output and total factor productivity.  Substantial reallocation takes place from the 
nontraded sector to the traded sector.  We construct a simple dynamic general equilibrium 
model and calibrate it to Mexico in 1988.  We find that the model can capture the large 
capital inflows into Mexico following its financial opening in 1989–90, both because 
Mexico was initially capital poor and because its working age population was growing 
rapidly.  When we subject the model to a sudden stop — the debt crisis in 1994–95 — it 
can reproduce the movements of the trade balance, the real exchange rate, and the relative 
price of nontraded goods.  When the sudden stop is the only exogenous shock, the model 
cannot reproduce the observed decreases in output and TFP.  We then quantitatively 
assess two frequently mentioned mechanisms that, at least qualitatively, could account 
for the decline in output and TFP, frictions in reallocating labor and variable capital 
utilization.  We find that these mechanisms cannot account for the observed behavior of 
output and TFP without causing the model to generate wild movements of the trade 
balance, the real exchange rate, and the relative price of nontraded goods.   
There have been numerous theories of why sudden stops occur; see, for example, 
Calvo (1988, 1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Cole and Kehoe (2000), and 
Mendoza (2006).  The models constructed to analyze a government’s decision to default 
on its debt or a foreign lender’s willingness to lend typically take the effects of the default 
on output as exogenous.  This is done to maintain tractability.  In contrast, a second line 
of research has focused on the effects of sudden stops, taking the sudden stop as given, 
which is our approach.  Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005), Cook and Devereux 
(2006), and Meza and Quintin (2007) exogenously impose sudden stops and study their 
effects on aggregate variables.     
   The empirical literature regarding sudden stops has mainly focused on aggregate 
variables.  Calvo and Talvi (2005), Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004), Chari, 
Kehoe and McGrattan (2005), and Meza and Quintin (2007) document the declines in 
GDP and TFP that accompany sudden stops.  Our findings regarding aggregate output 
and productivity are similar to theirs. 3 
This paper focuses on the effects of a sudden stop on the disaggregated economy.  
When credit is restricted, we find that traded output falls by less than nontraded output 
and that labor and investment move from the nontraded sector to the traded sector, as is 
also emphasized by Tornell and Westermann (2002).  We also find that the movement in 
the relative price of nontraded to traded goods accounts for about 20 percent of the 
movement in real exchange rates.  We document these characteristics for the sudden stop 
in Mexico in 1994–95.  Our findings are in line with Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 
(2005) and Mendoza (2005), who study the real exchange rate depreciations that 
accompany sudden stops and also find that nontraded goods prices play a large role in 
these depreciations.   
  Accounting for the declines in GDP and TFP that coincide with sudden stops is 
challenging.  Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) show that equilibrium models with 
standard preferences predict not an output decrease, but an increase because of a decrease 
in the consumption of leisure following a reversal of the current account balance.  They 
note that generating an output decrease requires frictions that have negative effects on 
output large enough to overcome the natural response to a decrease in credit.   
Our analysis follows the analysis of great depressions of Cole and Ohanian (1999) 
and Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007) in insisting that the model generates growth 
accounting that matches that in the data.  The growth accounting in the data indicates that 
most of the drop in output during the sudden stop is due to a drop in TFP.  We start by 
explaining that the negative terms of trade shock generated by the sudden stop cannot 
result in drops in TFP if output is measured as real GDP in base period prices as in the 
data.  We then extend our baseline model to incorporate two mechanisms that could 
generate this drop in TFP.  The first is costs to adjusting the amount of labor used in 
production in each sector.  These costs are modeled as drops in output, so the reallocation 
of labor between the two sectors generates a decrease in TFP.  In our calibrated model, 
however, these costs cannot account for the observed decrease in TFP; increasing these 
costs beyond a certain point just results in less reallocation.  The second is variable 
capital utilization, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) and Meza and 
Quintin (2007).  To the extent that the aggregate capital stock does not change but the 
amount of output falls, the drop in utilization during the sudden stop appears as a 4 
decrease in TFP.  In our model, however, while capital in the nontraded sector is 
underutilized during the sudden stop, capital in the traded sector is overutilized.  
Consequently, we find that variable capital utilization alone cannot account for the 
observed decrease in TFP.  Combining the labor adjustment costs and variable capital 
utilization and pushing these frictions towards their limits, we find that the model is able 
to generate the observed decrease in TFP.  Doing so, however, produces wild movements 
of the trade balance, the real exchange rate, and the relative price of nontraded goods.   
 Other researchers have suggested that financial constraints are important for 
understanding sudden stops:  see, for example, Calvo (1998), Mendoza and Smith (2004), 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Schneider and Tornell (2004).  We abstract from the 
financial sector in our model to quantitatively assess how far a standard model can go in 
explaining the effects of sudden stops.  As discussed above, our simple model can go a 
long way in accounting for the effects of a sudden stop, although the effects of a sudden 
stop may work through the financial sector in generating declining TFP.  It is worth 
noting that the papers in existing literature on financial constraints and sudden stops 
generate decreases in output largely through a decrease in labor, however, rather than 
through the observed decrease in TFP.    
As a final extension, we consider a specification of our model in which the 
economy is subject to an aggregate negative TFP shock.  We find that the extended 
model can also account for a large share of the decline in output without distorting our 
ability to account for prices and trade flows.  Although we do not view modeling the 
decrease in TFP as an exogenous shock as an appealing explanation for the observed 
decrease in output, we consider it an important robustness check.  
2.  The 1994–95 Mexican debt crisis 
In this section, we present the properties of Mexico’s opening to foreign capital in 1989–
90 and its sudden stop in 1994–95.  The successes and failures of our model depend on its 
ability to account for these properties.  The properties that we identify are typical of 
sudden stop episodes in a large sample of countries; see Tornell and Westermann (2002).   
Figure 1 plots Mexico’s trade balance as a share of GDP.  (All of the data used in 
this paper are available at www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe
 .)  As Mexico opened its capital 5 
markets, the country went from being a net lender to a net borrower.  In 1994, the trade 
deficit was 4.83 percent of GDP.  In the final weeks of 1994, the sudden stop began as 
the government had trouble rolling over its debt.  (See, for example, Kehoe 1995b.)  The 
trade deficit became trade surpluses of 2.66 and 2.06 percent of GDP in 1995 and 1996.  
When the sudden stop ended in 1997, the trade balance returned to a deficit, reaching 
2.14 percent of GDP in 1998. The trade balance reversal is a robust feature of sudden 
stops; see Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar (2004). 
To address the natural question of whether there were foreseeable conditions in 
Mexico that led to the sudden stop, consider the interest rate on Mexican dollar 
denominated debt.  (Our measure of this interest rate is the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market 
Bond Index spread on Mexican Brady Bonds, computed after stripping out the 
collateralized principal.)  We decompose this interest rate into two parts:   The first is the 
U.S. Treasury bill rate, which is our proxy for the risk free rate.  The second is the 
Mexico-specific interest rate spread, which is commonly used to measure the country 
specific interest rate premium.  We find that the interest premia on Mexican debt did not 
increase before the crisis.  In November 1994, the interest premium on Mexican debt was 
4.56 percent, less than the average premium from 1991 through November 1994.  Not 
until December, the first month of the crisis, did the premium increase to 8.90 percent 
and then peak at 16.37 in March 1995.  We take this behavior of interest premia as 
evidence that the sudden stop was sudden and largely unforeseen. 
The sudden stop was accompanied by a large depreciation of the real exchange 













where  ,, mex us t NER  is the peso-dollar exchange rate and  , jt P  is the price level in country  j , 
as measured using gross output deflators.  We plot the natural logarithm of the real 
exchange rate for Mexico in figure 2.  After the opening to foreign capital, the real 
exchange rate appreciated; at the onset of the sudden stop, the real exchange rate 
depreciated by 31.49 percent from 1994 to 1995 and appreciated again as the sudden stop 
ended, approaching its 1994 level in 2000.   6 
To decompose the movements of the real exchange rate into sectoral components, 
we follow Stockman and Tesar (1995) and Betts and Kehoe (2001) in defining 
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing as the traded goods sector and construction and 
services as the nontraded goods sector.  We rewrite (1) as  
(2) 
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where the price of traded goods, 
T P , is the gross output deflator for agriculture, mining, 
and manufacturing.  The first term in the decomposition measures the traded good real 
exchange rate.  The second term in the decomposition is the price of nontraded goods in 
the United States relative to that in Mexico.  We plot the log of 
N RER  in figure 2.  When 
Mexico opened to foreign capital, the price of nontraded goods increased by 15.84 
percent from 1988 to 1994.  This accounts for 42.24 percent of the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate.  During the sudden stop, the price of nontraded goods decreased by 
6.19 percent, accounting for 19.66 percent of the real exchange rate depreciation.  
We plot real GDP per working age (age 16–54) person and total factor 
productivity in figure 3.  The figure shows the sharp contraction of output during the first 
year of the sudden stop.  Real GDP per working age person fell by 9.05 percent in 1995.  
To measure TFP we use the aggregate production function, 
(3) 
1
tt t t YA K L
α α − = , 
where  t Y  is real GDP,  t A  is total factor productivity,  t K  is capital, and  t L  is hours 
worked in period t.  We choose a capital share of  0.38 α = , in line with the estimates of 








α α − = . 
The capital stock is constructed from investment data using the perpetual inventory 
method, and labor is measured as total hours worked.  TFP fell by 7.89 percent in 1995, 
almost matching the decline in output.   
We have seen that the sudden stop was accompanied by a decline in output.  The 
sectoral data allow us to say more.  In figure 4, we plot real value added for the traded 7 
and nontraded sectors in Mexico.  During the crisis, value added in the nontraded sector 
fell more than in the traded sector and then recovered at a much slower rate.  This shift in 
production is the focus of our analysis and a key ingredient in our model below.  In 
response to a sudden stop, the relative price of traded to nontraded goods increased, 
leading to a shift of resources away from the nontraded sector and into the traded sector.  
In the next section, we construct a general equilibrium model to help us account for the 
features of the data we have highlighted here.  
3.  Baseline model 
We model Mexico as a semi-small open economy with perfect foresight over the paths of 
interest rates, TFP, population, and tariffs.  Mexico is a small open economy in the sense 
that it takes world interest rates as exogenous, but Mexico is not small in the goods 
market.  The price of Mexico’s exported good changes in order to clear the market.  In 
1988 and 1989, the economy is closed to foreign capital.  The economy opens to foreign 
capital in 1990; five years later, there is a sudden stop when foreign investors 
unexpectedly stop lending to the country in 1995 and 1996.  From 1989 to 1993, Mexico 
liberalized its financial markets, internally and externally; see, for example, Kehoe 
(1995a).  We choose 1990 as the date to model the financial opening because, as figure 1 
shows, it was the first year in which Mexico had a large trade deficit.  Our model 
combines elements of the multisector, static applied general equilibrium models used to 
study NAFTA (see, for example, Kehoe and Kehoe 1994), the models of Fernández de 
Córdoba and Kehoe (2000) and Bems and Jönsson Hartelius (2006) used to study 
financial liberalization in small open economies, and the models in the collection of 
Kehoe and Prescott (2007) used to study great depressions.  
3.1 Production 
There are 5 types of goods in the model: a domestically produced traded good,  D y , an 
imported good, m , a composite traded good,  T y  made up of the domestic traded good 
and imports, a nontraded good,  N y , and an investment good, i.  All goods markets are 
perfectly competitive.  8 
The domestic traded good is produced using capital,  Dt k ,  labor,  Dt A ,  the 
composite traded good,  TD z , and the nontraded good,  ND z , according to 
(5)  ( )
1
=min / , / , 
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The producer chooses capital, labor, and intermediate inputs to minimize costs, which 
implies marginal product pricing conditions for capital and labor of the form  
(6)  () ( )
1 1 D
D t
tD t T D T t N D N t D D D t D t rpa p a p A k g
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− − =− − A , 
and similarly for the wage  t w .  Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply 
that the producer earns zero profits in equilibrium: 
(7) 0 Dt Dt t Dt t Dt Tt TDt Nt TNt py r k w pz pz −− − − = A . 
The production function for the nontraded good and the corresponding profit 
maximization conditions are defined analogously.  We assume that productivity in each 
sector grows at the same, constant rate  1 g − .  
The composite traded good is made up of imports and the domestic traded good 
using an Armington aggregator:  
(8)      () ()
1
1 Tt Dt t yM x m
ζζ ζ μμ =+ −. 
The imported good is the numeraire in this model, making its f.o.b. price equal to 1, but 
imports are subject to domestically levied tariffs,  t τ .  
The investment good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function:   
(9)     
1
It TIt NIt y Gz z
γ γ − = . 
Mexico is a semi-small open economy in the sense that it faces a downward 
sloping demand curve for its exports.  Foreign demand for the domestic traded good is 
(10)  () ()
1
1  1 Ft t Ft Tt xD p ζ τ
−
− =+ , 9 
where  Ft τ  is the tariff imposed by the rest of the world on its imports.  This export 
demand function implies that the rest of the world has an Armington aggregator that is 
analogous to the one in Mexico (8).  The factor  t D  grows over time, reflecting the 
increasing demand for the goods produced in Mexico.  This growth is driven by 
population growth in the rest of the world as well as by technological progress.   
3.2 Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households.  We differentiate the 
total population from the working age population.  We denote the working age population 
t A  and match it to the evolution of the population aged 15–64 in Mexico.  Letting  t n   
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to evaluate consumption per capita.  We normalize the amount of time available for work 
by a working age person to be 1 and denote the total labor supply in period t as  t A . 
Households choose this labor supply,  t A , consumption of traded goods and nontraded 
goods,  Tt c  and  Nt c , investment in capital  t i ,  and bond holdings,  t b ,  to maximize utility,  
(12)  ()
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subject to the budget constraint, 
(13)  ( ) 1 1 Tt Tt Nt Nt t t t t t t t Kt t t pc pc q i b w rb rk T + ++ + = + + + + A , 
the law of motion for capital, 
(14)  ( ) 1 1 tt t kk i δ + = −+ ,  
the appropriate nonnegativity constraints, initial conditions for the capital stock,  1988 k , 
and bond holdings,  1988 b , and a condition on bond holdings, 10 
(15) 
t
tt bn g B ≥− , 
where B is chosen large enough so that this constraint rules out Ponzi schemes but does 
not otherwise bind in equilibrium. 
  If the economy is open to foreign capital, so that consumers can buy and sell 
foreign bonds, the first order conditions for  t b  and  t k  imply the arbitrage condition 
(16)  ( ) ( ) 1 11 / tt K t t rq r q δ − += − + . 
When the economy is closed to foreign capital, the interest rate  t r  is endogenously 
determined by the return to domestic capital and payments on debt,  t b − , are made at an 
exogenous rate  t r .  When the economy is open to foreign capital  * tt rrσ = + , where the 
world interest rate is constant at  * r  and the interest rate premium is  t σ .  Bonds are 
denominated in units of the imported good, which implies that a real depreciation makes 
debt more expensive in terms of domestically produced goods.  Households receive a 
lump sum transfer,  t T ,  of tariff revenues collected on imports.  In our calibration, we also 
impose a tax on net capital income in 1989 to account for the low level of investment in 
1988 relative to future periods, replacing  1989 K r  in the budget constraint (13) by 
() 1989 1989 1 KK r τ − .  The revenue from this tax is also rebated in the lump sum transfer  1989 T . 
3.3 Market clearing and equilibrium 
The market clearing conditions are 
(17) =  DtD t x y  
(18)         Nt NIt NDt NNt Nt czzzy + ++=  
(19)           Tt TIt TDt TNt Ft Tt czzzxy ++ + + = 
(20)  tI t iy =  
(21)   DtN tt kkk + =  
(22)   DtN tt + = AAA . 11 
The balance of payments condition is 
(23)  ( ) 1  1 tt T t F t t t mb p x r b + += + + . 
Here  () 1  1 DtF t t t t t p xm b r b + −= − +  is the balance of trade and  1   tt T t F t t t t bb p xm r b + − =− +  is 
the balance of payments. 
  In the model without a sudden stop, an equilibrium consists of sequences of all 
relevant variables such that households maximize utility subject to the budget constraints 
and other constraints, the prices and quantities satisfy the profit maximization conditions 
for producers, the rest of the world demands Mexican exports according to its demand 
function, the market clearing conditions and balance of payments conditions hold, and 
tariff and tax revenues equal the lump sum rebate in each year.  The economy is closed to 
foreign capital flows in 1988 and 1989, and we assume that net foreign bond holdings 
stay constant at  1990 1989 1988 bbb == and that payments on the debt  t b −  are made at the rate 
1990 1989 1988 rrr ==.  In the model with a sudden stop in 1995, the equilibrium is that of the 
model without the sudden stop up until 1995.  The equilibrium in 1995 and thereafter is 
that of a model starting in 1995, with initial capital and foreign bond holdings given by 
the model without a sudden stop, but in which the economy is closed to foreign capital 
flows in 1995 and 1996, and in which net foreign bond holdings stay constant at 
1997 1996 1995 bbb == and that payments on the debt  t b −  are made at the rate 
1997 1996 1995 rrr ==.  In other words, we model the equilibrium as one of perfect foresight, 
except that the sudden stop is completely unexpected. 
  The period in the model is one year.  To compute the equilibrium of the model, 
we truncate the model after 100 years, requiring the equilibrium to converge to a 
balanced growth path in 2088.  See Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007) for information 
about how to do this sort of computation, including an algorithm.  
4.  Calibration 
As in the multisector, static applied general equilibrium models analyzed by Kehoe and 
Kehoe (1994), most of the model’s parameters are calibrated so that the equilibrium of 
the model in 1988 replicates the data in an input-output matrix.  Table 1 presents such a 12 
matrix for Mexico in 1988.   We take the United States to stand in for the rest of the 
world; in 1994, the United States accounted for 68.97 percent of total merchandise 
imports to Mexico and 84.22 percent of total merchandise exports from Mexico.   
  The dynamic nature of the model makes several other features of the calibration 
of crucial importance.  The initial capital stock  1988 k  and the initial tax on capital 
income 1989 K τ  are calibrated so that Mexico is capital poor.  (We could impose a tax 
1988 K τ , but it is irrelevant since  1988 k  is fixed and tax revenues are rebated to consumers.)  
In 1990, Mexico not only opens itself to foreign capital flows, but also undertakes 
reforms to domestic financial markets that we model as an elimination of  1989 K τ .  Also of 
crucial importance to the dynamics of the model are the calibration of the paths for 
working age population and adult equivalent population,  t A  and  t n , and the growth in 
these variables compared to growth in the United States, captured by  t D .  When Mexico 
opens to capital flows, it borrows, not only because it is capital poor, but also because it 
has a rapidly growing working age population.   The rapidly growing population causes 
this borrowing to persist over time.  The interest premia  t σ  play an important role in 
determining the path of borrowing, in particular, slowing it initially.  Of less importance 
are the paths for Mexican tariffs  t τ  and U.S. tariffs  Ft τ .  We summarize the baseline 
model’s calibration in table 2. 
4.1 Production parameters 
The parameters in the production functions for the domestic traded and nontraded goods 
are computed from the input-output matrix in table 1.  We choose quantities for the 
model so that all prices and the wage rate are equal to 1 in 1988.  Quantity units have 
been normalized so that GDP is 100.  Since prices have been normalized to 1, this means 
that every quantity is expressed as a percent of 1988 GDP.   
Using the profit maximization conditions for producers, we calibrate the 
parameters of the production functions so that the quantities in the input-output matrix 
are equilibrium values in 1988.  Consider, for example, the production function for the 
investment good (9).  The first order conditions for profit maximization imply that  13 
(24) 
1988 1988










Setting  1988 1988 1 TN pp ==  and plugging in the values  1988 10.158 TI z =  and  1988 12.403 NI z = , 
we obtain  0.450 γ = , which is in line with the estimates of Bems (2008).  We calculate 
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  To calibrate the Armington aggregator, we must choose the elasticity of 
substitution between imports and domestic traded goods,  ( ) 11ζ − .  As discussed in Ruhl 
(2008), there is debate over this elasticity since business cycle models tend to imply low 
elasticities while analysis of trade policy episodes suggests elasticities much higher.  We 
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. 
With prices normalized to 1 in the base year, μ  can be calculated using the data on 
imports and domestic traded goods.  The parameter M  is chosen so that the output of the 
composite traded good in equation (8) is that observed in the data.   
We choose the growth rate  1 g −  to be 2 percent, which is the growth rate of U.S. 
GDP per working age person during the twentieth century, and which Kehoe and Prescott 
(2007) argue is the growth rate implied by technological progress.  Our results indicate 
that this value may be a little too high for Mexico, at least during 1988–2000.   
We set  1988 0.1574 r = .  This value comes from setting  * 0.0400 r =  and from our 
data on interest premia and is similar to that obtained by the calculation of how much of 
the income difference between Mexico and the United States can be accounted for by 
differences in capital stocks by Kehoe (1995b).  Given that depreciation was 10.566 
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4.2 Household parameters 
We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  ( ) 11 0 . 5 ψ −=.  Following McGrattan 
and Prescott (2003), we set the world interest rate in the balanced growth path 
* 0.040 r = .  Requiring this interest rate to be consistent with balanced growth implies 
that  ()
1 1 * 0.987 gr
ψ β
− =+ = .  Following Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982) and 
Stockman and Tesar (1995), we set the elasticity of substitution between traded and 
nontraded goods in consumption as 1/(1 ) 0.5 ρ − = .  The first order conditions from the 
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which can be used to calibrate ε .  Given the value of   / 0.267 tt = AA  from the data set of 
Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2002), we can similarly calibrate η .   
In 1989, Mexico ran a trade surplus of 1.390 percent of GDP.  We set the initial 
stock of bonds held by the consumer,  0 b , so that the model replicates this statistic.  To 
account for the level of investment in 1989 in the input-output matrix, we set 
1989 0.201 K τ =  in the baseline numerical experiment.  Since the return to capital in 1989 
varies in our other numerical experiments, we need to recalibrate  1989 K τ  in each one. 
4.3 Exogenous processes 
To account for any changes that might be due to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, we include falling tariffs in the model.  We model Mexican tariffs on U.S. 
goods as being 10.00 percent until 1994, at which time they fall to 5.00 percent.  From 
1994 to 2004 the tariff rates fall by 0.50 percentage points a year, until they are 0.  U.S. 
tariffs on Mexican goods are 3.00 percent until 1994, at which time they fall to 1.50 
percent.  From there, tariffs fall by 0.15 percentage points per year until they reach 0 in 15 
2004.  Both tariffs remain at 0 forever after 2004.  (See Kehoe 1995a for information on 
the Mexican trade reform.) 
As can be seen in figure 5, the interest premium on Mexican debt fell from 11.74 
percent in December of 1990 to 4.56 percent in November of 1994.  These higher interest 
rates are usually regarded as country specific risk premia, and the gradual elimination of 
these premia reflect the idea that Mexico gradually gained credibility as it instituted 
structural changes.  Since we do not model the structural changes taking place in the 
Mexican economy, we take as exogenous a time varying interest premium on the rate at 
which Mexico can borrow from the rest of the world.  This approach is also used in Bems 
and Jönsson Hartelius (2006) and Cook and Devereux (2006).   
We use the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index spread on Brady Bonds as 
our measure of the Mexican interest premia, as discussed previously in section 2.  The 
premia spike in 1995, reflecting the increase in the perceived country risk following the 
sudden stop.  Since the post-1994 premia would not have evolved in the same way if the 
country had not experienced the crisis, we assume that agents believed the path of interest 
premia to be that same as in the data up to 1994, and that the premia gradually decline to 
zero by 2005.  These anticipated premia are graphed in figure 5.  Once the sudden stop 
has occurred, agents perfectly foresee the path of interest rates that are the same as in the 
data until 1998, at which point they gradually decline to zero by 2015.  Our data start in 
1991, and we assume that the premia for 1988–90 are the same as in 1991.   
Population growth rates for the United States and Mexico are exogenous to the 
model.  These population growth rates are constructed from the observed data for 1988–
2005 and from population projections made by the United Nations for 2005–50.  (See the 
data appendix available at www.econ.umn.edu/ ~tkehoe.)  We determine the series for 
t D  using the calibrated value for  1988 D , the growth factor   1.020 g = , and the growth of 
working age population in the United States.  It is worth noting that the constant interest 
rate  * 0.040 r =  is not consistent with varying population growth, but we do not intend to 
carefully model the dynamics of U.S. interest rates. 
In the formula for the real exchange rate in (1) and that for the relative price of 
nontraded goods in (2), we need a series for the relative price  ,,
T
us t us t PP .  We take this 16 
series from the data.  Given our modeling of Mexico as a semi-small open economy, this 
series plays no role in our model, only in the comparison of the results with the data. 
5.  Results 
Before subjecting the model to a sudden stop, it is useful to study briefly the model 
without a sudden stop.  When Mexico opens to capital flows, its capital-output ratio is 
lower than it will be in the balanced growth path.  Figure 6 plots the capital-output ratio 
for the model without a sudden stop.  Mexico accumulates capital until it reaches the 
balanced growth path.  To smooth consumption over the transition, the country borrows 
from abroad initially, running trade deficits.  The deficits switch to surpluses as the 
country pays back the debt.   
5.1 Baseline model 
When the sudden stop occurs, the traded good, whose use was being financed by a trade 
deficit, becomes relatively scarce and its price increases.  Since the sudden stop is 
unexpected, capital and labor are not efficiently allocated across the two sectors, so they 
are reallocated from the nontraded to the traded good sector.  The results of the baseline 
numerical experiment are summarized in figure 7 and table 3.   
Figure 7(a) plots the trade balance in the model and the data.  As in the graphs 
that follow, the data are plotted as a solid line and the model results are plotted as a 
dashed line.  The model does a good job of reproducing the shape of the trade balance.  
The trade balance goes negative when the country opens to capital flows and sharply 
reverses when the sudden stop occurs.  As the sudden stop ends, the trade balance returns 
to a deficit, though it takes longer in the model, not turning negative until 2002.  In the 
model, Mexico does not return to borrowing immediately following the sudden stop 
because the interest premia, shown in figure 5, remain high until 1999.   
Figure 7(b) plots the real exchange rate.  The real exchange rate in the model does 
not appreciate as quickly as in the data, but it displays the same sharp depreciation as the 
data during the sudden stop.  In the model, the real exchange rate depreciates by 41.36 
percent compared to the 31.49 percent in the data.  As the sudden stop ends, the real 
exchange rate appreciates, as in the data, although less so.  During the sudden stop, the 17 
price of nontraded goods in Mexico decreases.  This can be seen in figure 7(b), which 
displays the relative price of nontraded goods,  log
N RER − .  From 1994 to 1995 the price 
of nontraded goods in the model falls by 6.10 percent, compared to 6.19 percent in the 
data.   
Mendoza (2000) and others show that changes in 
T RER  and those in 
N RER are 
negatively correlated in periods of managed exchange rates and positively correlated 
otherwise.  The period 1988–2000 straddles a regime change; Mexico allowed the peso to 
float starting in 1995.  In the data, the correlation between first differences in 
T RER  and 
those in 
N RER  is −0.30 for 1988–94 and 0.79 for 1995–2000.  Our real model cannot 
address issues of nominal exchange rate management.  Nevertheless, it captures 36 
percent of the difference between the two correlations.  The relevant correlation is 0.54 
for 1988–94 and 0.93 for 1995–2000, suggesting that the relevant differences between the 
two subperiods involve more than just differences in exchange rate management.   
Our model departs from the small open economy framework by assuming that the 
terms of trade, which are plotted in figure 7(d), are not exogenous.  The terms of trade in 
the model depreciate much more than those in the data; the boom in exports that 
accompanies the sudden stop drives the traded good price too low relative to the data.  
Some of this is a result of model specification.  In the model, all domestically produced 
traded goods are exported, in contrast to a model where the good that is exported differs 
from the basket of all traded goods.  Data that are more closely related to our model’s 
terms of trade are the traded good real exchange rate, 
T RER .  Figure 7(d) shows that the 
depreciation in 
T RER  is larger than that in the terms of trade and is almost identical to 
that in model.  In section 5.5, we study a model with exogenous terms of trade.   
Much of the model’s failure to capture the speed at which the trade balance 
returned to a deficit and the real exchange rate appreciated is due to the high interest 
premia in 1998 and 1999, due to the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis.  A model in 
which the jump in these premia is sudden and unforeseen could do better in capturing the 
trade deficits and the real exchange rate depreciation.  So could a model in which a 
period is a quarter rather than a year — notice that, in figure 5, the interest premia are not 
high during all of 1998 or 1999. 18 
Figure 7(c) shows that the model reproduces the shift of production from the 
nontraded to the traded sector, but it fails to capture the falling output in the traded sector.  
Output in the nontraded sector does fall, but not by as much as it does in the data.  Figure 
7(f) compares GDP per working age person and TFP in the model and in the data.  The 
model does a poor job of generating the decline in output and TFP that we see in the data.  
We discuss this feature of the model in detail in section 6. 
The qualitative features of our results come from having two goods, one of which 
is nontraded, and an initial capital stock that is below its balanced growth levels.  The 
quantitative features of our results are determined by many factors, but the most 
important two are the specifications of the interest rate premia and of the population 
growth rates.  In extensive sensitivity analysis not reported here, we have found that it is 
these sorts of factors — those related to the model’s dynamics — that are most important 
to our results.  The specifications of the static features are far less important.  When we 
model the combination of intermediate goods and value added in the production functions 
for goods in (5) as being Cobb-Douglas rather than fixed proportions, for example, we 
find that the results change by negligible amounts.  
5.2 Model without interest rate premia 
To see how the interest premia determine our results, we consider a model without them.  
We recalibrate parameters to match the same targets as in the baseline model.  Table 3 
summarizes the model’s results.  The results for the model without interest premia are 
qualitatively similar to those of the baseline model, but are far more volatile, as can be 
seen in figure 8(a).  Without the gradually falling premia, Mexico immediately runs large 
trade deficits, quickly accumulating debt. When the sudden stop occurs, the current 
account reversal is much larger than in the baseline model.  When the sudden stop ends, 
the country immediately returns to borrowing. 
  Immediately being able to borrow at the world interest rate leads to a larger 
movement out of the traded good sector in the early 1990s.  This increases the price of 
the domestic traded good and drives the sharp real exchange rate appreciation in figure 
8(b).  During the sudden stop, the real exchange rate depreciates even more so than in the 
baseline model as the larger debt that has been accumulated requires larger interest 19 
payments, which brings about a larger boom in exports.  As is clear from table 3, the 
interest premia have little effect on the aggregate quantities. 
5.3 Model without population growth 
Mexico is experiencing a demographic transition; the population of age 15–64 is growing 
faster than the total population.  The growing working age population increases the 
demand for capital, creating a greater incentive to borrow abroad.  In this section, we 
consider the baseline model, but without population growth.  The results are summarized 
in table 3.  Figure 9(a) plots the trade balance.  It is clear from the figure that population 
growth is a key driver of the model.  Without population growth, Mexican households 
quickly accumulate enough capital to make borrowing unnecessary, which can be seen by 
comparing figure 9(b) to 7(f).  In fact, after the sudden stop, agents would like to lend to 
the rest of the world in order to take advantage of the high interest rate premia in 1998. 
5.4 Model without trade liberalization 
During the period we study, Mexico was liberalizing its trade, both unilaterally and 
through the North American Free Trade Agreement.  To capture this in the baseline 
model, we have tariffs falling over time, as described in section 4.  We test the sensitivity 
of the model to this assumption by solving the model with tariffs set to zero in every 
period.  The recalibration to 1988 requires us to modify the input-output matrix to 
eliminate the initial tariff.  The results of this model are summarized in table 3.  Besides 
speeding up import growth in the early 1990s and slightly increasing the overall volatility 
of our results, removing trade liberalization has little effect.  
5.5 Exogenous terms of trade 
In the baseline model, Mexico faces an export demand function (10).  This specification, 
although standard in static applied general equilibrium trade models, is a departure from 
the common assumption that the export price is an exogenous variable in open economy 
macro models.  The terms of trade in the baseline model depart significantly during the 
sudden stop, as was seen in figure 7(d).  In this version of the model, we allow the terms 
of trade to be endogenous in all periods except for 1995.  We adjust  t D , the scale 20 
parameter in the export demand function, (10), in 1995 and thereafter by the factor of 
1.638, so that the increase in the terms of trade in the model is exactly the same as it is in 
the data.  This is an increase in U.S. demand for Mexican exports resulting from NAFTA, 
but not captured by our Armington specification (10).  We can think of Ruhl (2008) as 
providing a justification, but we should note that we assume that the increase is not 
foreseen.  The results are summarized in table 3 and figure 10.   
  In table 3, the results from the model with exogenous terms of trade differ from 
the baseline results in two significant ways: during the sudden stop, the real exchange 
rate does not depreciate enough, and imports increase.  The smaller depreciation of the 
real exchange rate is, again, the product of the model specification; the terms of trade are 
T RER , so dampening the terms of trade dampens 
T RER , which dampens the response of 
the real exchange rate.  Given the specification that the exported good is the same as the 
traded good, the model accounts either for the terms of trade or the real exchange rate, 
but not both.  To do both, we would need to model exports as having a different price 
than the basket of all traded goods.       
6.  Output and productivity 
The baseline model can account for the trade balance, real exchange rates, and relative 
prices.  Yet, as seen in figure 7(f), it cannot reproduce the output dynamics in Mexico.   
We decompose the growth of GDP using an accounting framework based on the 
neoclassical growth model.  Following Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Kehoe and 
Prescott (2002), we write the production function in (3) in terms of output per working 



















where  t N  is the working age population.  We take the logarithm of (30) and use it to 
decompose changes in output per working age person into changes in labor, capital 
accumulation, and TFP.   
The growth accounting is presented in table 3.  In 1988–94 output per working 
age person grew at a rate of 1.06 percent per year, more than half of which came from an 21 
increase in hours worked.  During the sudden stop, output per working age person fell by 








α − , 
increased by 6.18 percent, and hours worked per working age person fell by 2.38 percent.  
Since the end of the crisis, output per working age person grew at 3.16 percent per year, 
mostly accounted for by growth in TFP and hours worked.  Our results are similar to 
those in Meza and Quintin (2007) who also use a growth accounting framework to study 
sudden stops in Mexico and countries affected by the Asian crisis in the late 1990s.   
Growth accounting makes it clear that any theory that hopes to explain the drop in 
output following a sudden stop must also deliver a sharp decline in aggregate TFP.  Our 
growth accounting provides discipline — as in the papers in Kehoe and Prescott (2007) 
— to our search for a model of output dynamics.  In what follows, we consider candidate 
explanations for the output drops that have been suggested in the literature: the increased 
price of intermediate inputs, frictions in the labor market, variable capital utilization, and 
quasilinear utility functions.    
In analyzing the results from our model, we do growth accounting using equation 
(30), treating the data generated by our model just as the Mexican statistical agency, the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística,  Geografía, e Informática, and we treat the data from 
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Similarly, we calculate the investment that goes into calculating the capital stock in 
equation (30) by dividing investment expenditures in current prices  Tt TIt Nt NIt p zp z +  by 
the GDP deflator formed by dividing GDP in current prices by constant prices in equation 
(31).  Notice that the resulting measure of the capital stock differs from that in the model 
in equations (9) and (14).  This is true especially in the model with variable capital 
utilization and allows the model to account for some of the changes in measured TFP.    22 
6.1 Imported intermediate goods 
At the onset of the sudden stop, the terms of trade turned against Mexico.  Consequently, 
the exports that Mexico was producing now bought fewer imported intermediate goods.  
Thus, negative terms of trade shocks have an effect similar to a negative TFP shock.  Was 
the deterioration in the terms of trade important for understanding Mexico’s output and 
TFP?  Quantitatively, the answer is no.  The terms of trade in the baseline model 
depreciate — even more so than in the data — yet there is no noticeable drop in either 
output or TFP.  Not only do terms of trade changes not quantitatively affect output in the 
model, but, when output is measured as real GDP in (31), the terms of trade shocks 
cannot qualitatively effect output either.  This is because the terms of trade enter GDP 
calculations as a price.  As discussed in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), the national accounting 
procedures imply that terms of trade shocks can rarely affect real GDP.   
6.2 Labor frictions 
In this section, we introduce a cost to firms that adjust their labor inputs.  During the 
sudden stop the economy wants to move workers from the nontraded sector to the traded 
sector.  In doing so, some output is lost.  Qualitatively, this creates a drop in GDP and a 
drop in TFP.  In this section, we assess the quantitative relevance of this friction. 
The model is identical to the baseline model except that firms lose some output if 
they adjust employment.  The adjustment function takes the quadratic form used by 
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The production function for nontraded goods changes similarly.  We assume that the 
costs grow at the same rate as productivity,  1 g − , so that the costs are nontrivial in the 
model’s balanced growth path.  We assume that labor in each sector has grown 
proportionately between 1987 and 1988.  Not imposing some sort of adjustment cost in 
1988 results in a sharp drop in output in 1989.  The adjustment costs in 1988 require us to 
recalibrate all of the parameters of each production function so that the equilibrium 
replicates the 1988 input-output matrix. 23 
The labor adjustment cost function adds a new parameter, θ , that we calibrate to 
match the reallocation of labor across the two sectors that we find in the data.  In Mexico, 
as in most industrialized countries, the share of labor used in the traded sector has a 
negative trend.  During the sudden stop, labor stops moving out of the traded sector and 
even increases by a small amount; this amounts to — relative to the trend — a significant 
reallocation of workers to the traded sector.  We could model this by specifying different 
rates of growth of technological progress,  D N gg > , in the production functions.  Instead, 
we abstract from the secular trend in employment, so we remove a least-squares linear 
time trend both from the data and from the model.  Figure 11(a) plots the detrended ratio 
of traded labor to total labor.  We set  6.468 θ =  so that the reallocation from 1994 to 
1997 is the same in the model as in the data.   
The results for the model with labor frictions are summarized in table 4.  Labor 
frictions have their largest impact on the price of nontraded goods, as shown in figure 
11(b).  The frictions restrict the amount of traded goods that can be produced, leading to 
higher traded good prices in this model relative to the baseline model.  The bilateral price 
of nontraded goods in Mexico falls 31.38 percent, more than five times that in the 
baseline model.  The large movement in the relative price of nontraded goods causes the 
real exchange rate to depreciate during the sudden stop by 61.30 percent compared to 
41.36 in the baseline model. 
  Returning to the original argument for including these costs, we can see from 
table 4 that GDP rises by about half as much as in the baseline model and TFP falls by 
0.26 percent; the movements are nowhere near as large as those in the data.  It is worth 
noting that movements in TFP are not monotonic in the cost parameter θ :  setting θ  very 
high results in very little movement of labor and very low costs incurred. 
6.3 Variable capital utilization 
Our third candidate explanation is variable capital utilization. Firms choose how much to 
utilize the capital stock, but the more that capital is used, the higher is the depreciation 
rate.  The trade-off implies that when the marginal product of capital is low, the agents 
will choose not to use it as much.  In the eyes of the statistician, though, capital is 24 
measured the same way regardless of utilization, which is unobserved.  This 
measurement issue implies that a decrease in utilization will appear as low productivity.   
  The law of motion for capital in the domestic traded sector is 
(33)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 DtD t D t D t ku k i δ + = −+ , 
where 
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Value added in the production function (5) is now  () ( )
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that the traded sector has the same utilization technology.  Here capital utilization is u ; 
the parameter ω  governs the curvature of the depreciation function; and δ  and χ  are 
parameters calibrated so that depreciation in 1988 is equal to that in the data and so that 
1988 1988 1 DN uu == .  This specification nests our baseline specification in the limiting case 
where ω  tends to infinity and the specification of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman 
(1988) in the case where  / χ ωδ = .   
  We first consider the case where we calibrate  3.751 ω =  so that  / χ ωδ = .  The 
results are summarized in table 4.  The model can generate about one-third of the drop in 
the TFP factor, but GDP still increases during the sudden stop.  This is because utilization 
is another margin on which to adjust.  During the sudden stop, traded capital utilization 
increases and nontraded capital utilization decreases, as in figure 12(b).  This allows the 
economy to produce more traded output than it could in the baseline model.   
  If we combine the labor frictions and variable capital utilization, we can account 
for the observed fall in TFP.  We set  6.510 ω =  and  8.964 θ = , producing both the drop 
in TFP and the reallocation of labor observed in the data.  In this specification,  / χ ωδ < .  
The labor friction makes it more difficult to move labor across the sectors, so the change 
in capital utilization is larger, creating the larger drop in TFP.  The model with both 
frictions also decreases GDP almost as much as in the data.  Notice, however, that the 
other results generated by the model are sharply at odds with the data:  the trade balance, 
real exchange rate, and relative price of nontraded goods fluctuate wildly.  By limiting 25 
the movements in labor, the model forces adjustments to take place elsewhere.  While 
combining frictions can match the observed drop in TFP, it destroys the model’s ability 
to account for other parts of the data.   
6.4 Quasilinear utility 
When the baseline model is hit with a sudden stop, the labor input increases because the 
wealth effect of the sudden stop overwhelms the substitution effect.  Households prefer to 
work more during the sudden stop and to consume less leisure to make up for the loss of 
income.  In some small open economy models, however, the period utility function is 
specified as a quasilinear function, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988), 
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so that there is no wealth effect on labor supply.  As Chakraborty (2006) points out, using 
this utility function in a one sector model of sudden stops eliminates the increase in labor 
because of the wealth effect generated by a standard utility function. 
  We consider a model with a utility in which  0 ψ = , that is, in which  
intertemporal utility is logarithmic, because we cannot calibrate a value of β  less than 1 
if   1 ψ =− .  We set  3 η =  and calibrate λ  to match hours worked in 1988.  Table 5 
reports the results.  These results are very similar to the baseline model, except the 
increase in labor during the sudden stop is less than half of that in the baseline model.  
Labor still increases because of the increase in working age population.  Labor per 
working age person declines slightly because of a small drop in the wage relative to the 
prices of consumption goods.  One problem with the quasilinear utility function is that it 
produces a large positive trend in labor as the economy increases its capital-output ratio. 
6.5 Exogenous decrease in TFP  
Our simple model, in which a sudden stop acts on an economy through the interaction of 
traded and nontraded goods, is successful in reproducing many features of the Mexican 
crisis, but is unable to account for the change in GDP.  In this section, we consider a 26 
version of the model with an exogenous TFP shock.  This exercise is not to suggest we 
should be content to model the observed decrease in TFP as exogenous, but rather to 
show that our model is capable of delivering decreases in aggregate output while still 
accounting for the trade flows and prices. 
  We modify the baseline model by allowing for a one-time, exogenous TFP drop.  
We introduce variation in TFP at the aggregate level by allowing the technological 
growth rate parameter in the domestic traded production function to vary with time, 
(36)  () ( )
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and similarly for the nontraded production function.  The shock to total factor 
productivity,  t ν , is the same across industries.  We assume that  t ν  is equal to 1 for all 
years before 1995, and is equal to  1 ν < for 1995 and thereafter.  This implies that TFP in 
the model falls exactly as much as it does in the data, as can be seen in figure 13(b).  
  We assume that agents are surprised by the TFP shock in the same way they are 
surprised about the sudden stop; they do not foresee the TFP drop, but they perfectly 
foresee the path of TFP afterward.  We compute the model using both the standard utility 
function, where we calibrate  0.880 ν = , and the quasilinear utility function, where we 
calibrate  0.878 ν = .  The results of the models are summarized in table 5.  In both 
models, the TFP drop has little effect on the results on prices and the trade balance.  
Where the TFP shock does matter is in the labor supply decision.  The drop in 
productivity makes wages fall during the sudden stop.  In the model with standard 
preferences, this causes labor to rise less than in the baseline model, but the wealth effect 
is still strong enough to increase labor.  With quasilinear utility, the substitution effect 
causes labor input to fall, even more so than in the data.  Overall, the exogenous drop in 
TFP makes the model fit the data — particularly the data on output — better.   
To capture the drop in labor during the sudden stop, there are alternatives to 
quasilinear utility.  Meza (2007), for example, shows that increases in taxes on labor and 
consumption in 1995 can account for the decrease in labor in a model with a standard 
utility function.  Including taxes in our model, as in Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007),   
could also help us account for the sharp drop in consumption that occurred in Mexico in 27 
1995.  As Meza (2007) points out, the value added tax in Mexico increased sharply that 
year.  Tornell and Westermann (2002) point out that severity of this drop was unusual 
among sudden stop experiences, and our model has trouble accounting for it.   
  That large exogenous changes in TFP can account for large changes in output in 
models like this is not a new result.  For example, many of the papers in Kehoe and 
Prescott (2007) have shown that the large declines in output that make up great 
depressions can be accounted for by exogenous drops in TFP.  We do not, however, 
believe that, for an exogenous reason unrelated to the sudden stop, TFP fell in 1995, but 
we leave identifying the inefficiencies set into motion by the sudden stop to future work, 
such as Mendoza (2006).  In this section, we have shown that, when the model is 
modified to produce a large decline in aggregate output, our results concerning prices and 
trade flows are largely unchanged.   
7.    Conclusion 
We have studied sudden stops focusing on their effects on the traded sector relative to the 
nontraded sector.  In the data, we find that the nontraded sector suffers a larger decline in 
output and a slower recovery from the sudden stop.  Resources are transferred from the 
nontraded sector to the traded sector and the relative price of traded goods increases.  
These facts provide insights into how sudden stops may move through the economy — 
namely, through relative price effects.  
  We have constructed a simple model with traded and nontraded goods and 
calibrated it to Mexico.  When we subject the model to a sudden stop — and nothing else 
— the model can account for the depreciation in real exchange rates and the trade balance 
reversal.  Though the simple model can account for prices and the behavior of the 
disaggregated economy, it cannot account for the changes in aggregate TFP and GDP.   
  Introducing frictions in terms of labor adjustment costs and variable capital 
utilization into the model can produce a decline in TFP.  If these frictions are large 
enough to account for the observed decrease in TFP, however, they generate wild results 
for the other variables.  The results for a model with an exogenous decrease in TFP 
indicate that identifying another mechanism by which the sudden stop causes a drop in 
TFP — possibly in combination with the frictions that we have studied — is needed. 28 
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Table 1 
1988 Input-Output Matrix  














































































































Traded 33.54  9.28 42.82 27.05 10.16  19.93  57.14 99.96
Nontraded 13.13  20.53 33.66 49.00 12.40  0.00  61.40 95.06
Total intermediate consumption  46.67  29.81 76.48 76.05 22.56  19.93  118.54 195.02
Labor compensation  22.11  38.74 60.85     60.85
Return to capital  10.79  26.51 37.30     37.30
Value added  32.89  65.26 98.15     98.15
Imports 18.54  0.00 18.54     18.54
Tariffs 1.85  0.00 1.85     1.85
Total gross output  99.96  95.06 195.02 76.05 22.56  19.93  118.54 313.5632 
Table 2 
Calibration of model 
Parameter Value  Statistic  Target 
Consumer parameters 
1988 b   -8.831    Trade balance to GDP in 1988, in percent  1.390  
1988 k   169.817    Real interest rate in 1988, in percent  15.740
β   0.987  U.S.  real  interest rate, in percent  4.000  
ε   0.234    Traded good share in consumption in 1988  0.356  
ρ   -1.000  Elasticity  of  substitution:  traded to nontraded  0.500  
η   0.306    Ratio of hours worked to available hours in 1988  0.267
ψ   -1.000  Intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  0.500  
δ   0.062    Depreciation to GDP in 1988, in percent  10.566  
1989 K τ   0.201    Investment in 1988  22.561
Producer parameters 
TD a   0.422    Share of traded inputs in domestic traded in 1988  0.422  
ND a   0.165    Share of nontraded inputs in domestic traded in 1988  0.165  
TN a   0.098    Share of traded inputs in domestic nontraded in 1988  0.098  
NN a   0.216  Share  of  nontraded  inputs  in domestic nontraded in 1988  0.216  
D A   2.770    Traded gross output in 1988  79.564  
N A   1.546    Nontraded gross output in 1988  95.065
D α   0.328    Capital’s share of domestic traded value added in 1988  0.328  
N α   0.406    Capital’s share of nontraded value added in 1988  0.406  
γ   0.450    Share of traded inputs in investment good production in 1988  0.450
G   1.990  Investment  in  1988  22.561  
g   1.020    Growth rate of  U.S. GDP per working age person, in percent  2.000
 Trade parameters 
M   1.866    Total traded goods in 1988  99.955  
μ   0.653    Ratio of imports to domestic traded good in 1988  0.233  
ζ   0.500    Elasticity of substitution:  domestic traded to imports  2.000  
1988 D   21.141  Exports  in  1988  19.928
Time series of parameters 
t A       Mexican working age population data and projections 
t n     Mexican  adult  equivalent  population data and projections 
t σ      Mexican  interest  premia 
t D       U.S. working age population data and projections   
t τ       Mexican tariffs on U.S. imposts 
Ft τ       U.S. tariffs on Mexican imports 33 
 Table 3 
Numerical experiments:  Sensitivity analysis 
            Data Baseline  No interest 
rate premia 
No population 
growth  No tariffs  Terms of trade 
TB/Y*100   1988-1994    -1.04    -1.36 -2.20 -0.21   -1.41 -1.36
(difference)   1994-1995     7.49    11.80 17.29 0.14   13.21 10.68
      1995-2000     -0.93     -0.80   -2.79   1.46    -1.05   -0.65  
RER   1988-1994    -6.25    -2.06 -4.97 1.15   -2.79 -2.06
(percent change)   1994-1995     31.49    36.93 54.93 3.69   42.00 14.17
      1995-2000     -5.81     -3.05   -8.28   1.88    -3.99   -2.47  
RERN   1988-1994    -2.64    -1.05 -1.16 -0.82   -1.03 -1.05
(percent change)   1994-1995     6.19    5.52 7.63 0.60   5.93 3.73
      1995-2000     -0.99     -2.32   -2.76   -1.42    -2.41   -2.17  
Tot   1988-1994    -1.77    -0.63 -2.76 1.73   -1.42 -0.63
(percent change)   1994-1995     8.31    25.31 37.39 2.59   29.74 8.31
      1995-2000     -1.70     -0.51   -4.34   2.80    -1.33   -0.14  
C/N   1988-1994     2.54    3.97 4.98 1.30   3.92 3.97
(percent change)   1994-1995     -15.86    -1.08 5.76 -2.79   -0.21 -0.78
      1995-2000     3.34     3.52   2.83   2.23    3.35   3.81  
I/N   1988-1994     0.42    14.82 16.82 12.57   14.95 14.82
(percent change)   1994-1995     -18.03   -10.64 -65.36 18.09   -14.64 -5.71
      1995-2000     6.81     2.86   15.01   -7.32    3.68   2.44  
X/N   1988-1994    -1.76    -1.28 -7.61 4.59   -3.89 -1.28
(percent change)   1994-1995     50.32    65.90 97.71 6.24   75.82 73.70
      1995-2000     3.52     -0.89   -10.40   6.55    -3.10   0.15  
M/N   1988-1994     3.64    7.06 8.56 4.93   5.92 7.06
(percent change)   1994-1995     15.94    0.62 -10.04 5.50   -3.04 15.57
      1995-2000     6.61     2.82   5.33   0.08    2.10   2.90  
GDP/N   1988-1994     1.06    5.82 6.43 4.41   5.79 5.82
(percent change)   1994-1995    -8.89    7.26 1.30 5.56   7.92 8.00
      1995-2000     3.16     2.48   3.59   0.30    2.37   2.67  
TFP factor   1988-1994     0.20    2.14 2.65 1.80   2.13 2.14
(percent change)   1994-1995     -12.69    0.00 -1.24 1.75   1.42 1.11
      1995-2000     2.77     1.81   2.26   1.64    1.77   1.95  
Capital factor   1988-1994     0.20    2.39 3.16 3.16   2.46 2.39
(percent change)   1994-1995     6.18    0.77 5.22 0.63   0.22 0.32
      1995-2000     -0.94     1.56   1.20   2.18    1.52   1.65  
Labor factor   1988-1994     0.65    1.29 0.97 -0.54   1.20 1.29
(percent change)   1994-1995    -2.38    6.49 -2.30 3.18   6.29 6.57
      1995-2000     1.33     -0.89   0.30   -3.53    -0.92   -0.93  34 
Table 4 
Numerical experiments:  Adjustment frictions 








TB/Y*100  1988-1994 -1.04 -1.36 -1.63 -2.13    -2.50
(difference)  1994-1995 7.49 11.80 17.40 21.04  37.50
   1995-2000 -0.93   -0.80   -1.93   -2.64     -5.92  
RER  1988-1994 -6.25 -2.06 -2.91 -2.90    -4.99
(percent change)  1994-1995 31.49 36.93 65.59 61.73   110.77
   1995-2000 -5.81   -3.05   -8.06   -6.38    -14.80  
RERN  1988-1994 -2.64 -1.05 -1.29 -1.05    -1.38
(percent change)  1994-1995 6.19 5.52 31.30 6.80  44.69
   1995-2000 -0.99   -2.32   -7.19   -2.38     -9.49  
Tot  1988-1994 -1.77 -0.63 -1.11 -1.28    -2.61
(percent change)  1994-1995 8.31 25.31 27.51 44.74  53.26
   1995-2000 -1.70   -0.51   -0.63   -3.27     -4.34  
C/N  1988-1994 2.54 3.97 3.44 2.77   2.64
(percent change)  1994-1995 -15.86 -1.08 -2.93 2.45    -5.43
   1995-2000 3.34   3.52   4.36   4.21     6.67  
I/N  1988-1994 0.42 14.82 17.70 27.67  27.09
(percent change)  1994-1995 -18.03 -10.64 -33.72 -34.81    -84.49
   1995-2000 6.81   2.86   8.37   10.01    21.29  
X/N  1988-1994 -1.76 -1.28 -2.96 -3.14    -7.45
(percent change)  1994-1995 50.32 65.90 102.29 112.24   179.99
   1995-2000 3.52   -0.89   -7.05   -7.27     -18.65  
M/N  1988-1994 3.64 7.06 7.73 12.10  12.01
(percent change)  1994-1995 15.94 0.62 14.88 -13.39    7.57
   1995-2000 6.61   2.82   0.31   5.88     2.56  
GDP/N  1988-1994 1.06 5.82 6.36 10.45   9.74
(percent change)  1994-1995 -8.89 7.26 2.98 3.89    -2.19
   1995-2000 3.16   2.48   3.81   4.46     6.80  
TFP factor  1988-1994 0.20 2.14 3.00 1.36   4.39
(percent change)  1994-1995 -12.69 0.00 -1.98 -4.75    -12.69
   1995-2000 2.77   1.81   2.29   2.49     5.28  
Capital factor  1988-1994 0.20 2.39 2.80 3.88   3.73
(percent change)  1994-1995 6.18 0.77 4.42 6.81  10.84
   1995-2000 -0.94   1.56   1.06   2.03     0.39  
Labor factor  1988-1994 0.65 1.29 0.55 5.20   1.62
(percent change)  1994-1995 -2.38 6.49 0.54 1.84    -0.35
   1995-2000  1.33   -0.89   0.47   -0.07     1.14  35 
Table 5 
Numerical experiments:  Quasilinear utility and exogenous TFP 




Exogenous TFP and 
quasilinear utility 
TB/Y*100  1988-1994 -1.04  -1.36 -1.36 -1.36    -1.36
(difference)  1994-1995 7.49  11.80 11.55 12.09    11.88
   1995-2000 -0.93    -0.80   -0.76   -0.70      -0.59  
RER  1988-1994 -6.25  -2.06 -2.00 -2.06    -2.00
(percent change)  1994-1995 31.49  36.93 34.90 34.36    31.79
   1995-2000 -5.81    -3.05   -2.67   -3.01      -2.62  
RERN  1988-1994 -2.64  -1.05 -1.05 -1.05    -1.05
(percent change)  1994-1995 6.19  5.52 5.63 5.84    5.99
   1995-2000 -0.99    -2.32   -2.34   -2.38      -2.40  
Tot  1988-1994 -1.77  -0.63 -0.58 -0.63    -0.58
(percent change)  1994-1995 8.31  25.31 23.58 22.94    20.72
   1995-2000 -1.70    -0.51   -0.18   -0.43      -0.09  
C/N  1988-1994 2.54  3.97 3.73 3.97    3.73
(percent change)  1994-1995 -15.86  -1.08 -2.44 -8.30    -11.04
   1995-2000 3.34    3.52   4.00   2.97      3.09  
I/N  1988-1994 0.42  14.82 15.46 14.82    15.46
(percent change)  1994-1995 -18.03  -10.64 -17.71 -22.17    -31.66
   1995-2000 6.81    2.86   4.05   2.32      2.97  
X/N  1988-1994 -1.76  -1.28 -1.14 -1.28    -1.14
(percent change)  1994-1995 50.32  65.90 62.00 60.80    55.83
   1995-2000 3.52   -0.89   -0.16  -0.76      0.01  
M/N  1988-1994 3.64  7.06 7.15 7.06    7.15
(percent change)  1994-1995 15.94  0.62 -1.90 -5.13    -8.82
   1995-2000 6.61    2.82   3.33   2.37      2.58  
GDP/N  1988-1994 1.06  5.82 5.91 5.82    5.91
(percent change)  1994-1995 -8.89  7.26 3.56 -1.10    -6.48
   1995-2000 3.16    2.48   3.24   2.03      2.44  
TFP factor  1988-1994 0.20  2.14 2.14 2.14    2.14
(percent change)  1994-1995 -12.69  0.00 0.32 -12.69    -12.69
   1995-2000 2.77    1.81   1.78   1.85      1.83  
Capital factor  1988-1994 0.20  2.39 2.27 2.39    2.27
(percent change)  1994-1995 6.18  0.77 3.49 5.89    9.64
   1995-2000 -0.94    1.56   1.03   1.00      0.44  
Labor factor  1988-1994 0.65  1.29 1.50 1.29    1.50
(percent change)  1994-1995 -2.38  6.49 -0.24 5.70    -3.42



















































































































































































Trade balance (left scale)
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Figure 8 
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Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
Model with labor frictions 
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Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
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